Wednesday, September 10, 2008

Buckwalter Update

Back in February, I had posted about the Buckwalter case which upheld an ordinance that changed the compensation of the Borough Council. On September 3, 2008 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur and will hear the appeal from the Commonwealth Court's decision.

Thank you to all of you readers that sent the link to me concerning the grant of allocatur.

Thursday, July 31, 2008

Prevailing Wage Act Part 2

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's ruling that road milling and resurfacing projects fall under the definition of "public work" in the Prevailing Wage Act. Now, Townships will now be required to pay the prevailing wage for some projects that were previously considered to be routine maintenance work, which is exempt from the law's requirements. The Supreme Court examined the underlying principles of the Prevailing Wage Act, which the Court said is to protect workers employed on public works projects from receiving substandard pay.

The Department of Labor & Industry which sets the prevailing wage, has issued a list of common road projects and how they will be classified.

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

Prevailing Wage Act Applies to Road Milling/Resurfacing

The Commonwealth Court has issued a decision which could significantly impact municipal road budgets. In Borough of Youngwood v. Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, 983 A.2d 1198 (Pa. Cwlth. 2007) the borough milled and resurfaced five streets at a cost of approximately $183,000.00. Liquid fuels funds paid $71,000.00. The borough believed the resurfacing was "maintenance" and therefore, not subject to the Prevailing Wage Act. It should be noted that the Act defines "public work" as "construction, reconstruction, demolition, alteration, and/or repair, other than maintenance work" that is performed under contract and paid for in whole or in part with public funds at a cost of more than $25,000.00. "Maintenance work" is defined in the Act as "repair of existing facilities when the size, type, or extent of such facilities is not thereby changed or increased."

After the borough had completed the project, the state Department of Labor & Industry's Bureau of Labor Law Compliance concluded that the major portion of the project (the milling and resurfacing) was reconstruction, not maintenance. Thus, the Bureau said the minimum wage requirements of the Prevailing Wage Act applied.

The borough appealed the decision to the Prevailing Wage Appeals Board which upheld the Department's interpretation of the Act. The borough then appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court agreed that the work was not maintenance and therefore, would be subject to the prevailing wage requirements.

An appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been filed by the borough and the Supreme Court has decided to accept and hear the appeal.

Monday, May 5, 2008

New Law Passed for EMS and Townships

The Govenor recently signed Act 7 of 2008. This law requires townships to work with local fire and emergency medical services to determine appropriate levels of funding and assistance. The new act will require the township board of supervisors to consult with volunteer fire and ems providers on the township's needs to determine appropriate levels of financial and administrative assistance for these services. Both fire and ems providers will be required to give the township an annual itemized list of all expenditures of township funds before the board of supervisors may consider budgeting additional funding for the organizations.

There is no minimum level of financial assistance required by Act7. Also, the act does not give emergency service providers the right to demand a specific amount or to withhold services. The purpose of the law is to encourage dialogue and cooperation between townships and emergency service providers to ensure that the municipality's public safety needs are met.

A copy of the act is available at www.legis.state.pa.us under the heading "Law Information."

Friday, April 11, 2008

What a Mayor Does

Found some useful information from the Pennsylvania State Association of Boroughs about the role of a Mayor. In 1834 the first general law regarding boroughs was enacted. The governing body was established, consisting of five councilmen and one burgess. The burgess presided over the council and remained active in borough matters. Over time, the vote of the burgess was restricted to breaking tie votes in most situations of the council.

The late 1800s saw more changes in the role of the burgess. The council was now allowed to vote for its own president, the burgess went from a one year term of office to a four year term of office. In 1893 the borough changed to a city format of government with a weak mayor. In 1961 the term burgess was replaced by the term "mayor" and the council president was given the power to sign important papers and contracts.

The powers of the mayor have diminished over time. Nevertheless, it is still an important positioon in local government. The mayor presides over the reorganization meeting of the council in even numbered years. The Mayor may attend all council meetings. He or she must approve all ordinances of a legislative nature and has the right to veto them if desired. The mayor administers the police department but does not have the power to hire or fire personnel. The mayor may set the schedule for the police officers. Finally, in a ceremonial role, the mayor may officiate marriages in the Commonwealth.

Thursday, March 20, 2008

Agony of Defeat II

Just a quick follow up to a post from a few weeks ago. I had written about losing a surcharge trial. My clients, the Board of Auditors, have directed me to file an appeal. I filed my Notice to the Commonwealth Court last week. I will update as progress occurs on this case.

Friday, March 7, 2008

Sewer Service Fee Upheld

A recent Commonwealth Court opinion has uphled the municipality's fee for sewer service. In Washington Realty Co. v. Municipality of Bethel Park, 937 A.2d 1146 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) the municipality charged a $30 customer service fee for each of the premises. The owner of an apartment building argued that premises meant one building, but the municipality defined premises as each apartment unit. The Commonwealth Court ruled the fee was rational, not excessive and it affirmed the municipality's definition of premises.